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Nuclear Weapon and Military Equipment
3. N A T A R A J A N
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Abstract. Military equipment must survive a, nuclear attack if enough personnel
required to operate them remain combat effective.  To achieve this goal,  the criteria
that  determine equipment  survivabil i ty  should be establ ished and any new design
should incorporate these cri teria to evolve a hardened design. An analysis of the
overall  response by considering the response to each individual  nuclear environment
can result  in a balanced overall  hardened system. The paper discusses the criteria
required to be known.
Nuclear weapons are well known for their devastating effects viz. blast, thermal radia-
tion and the initial or prompt nuclear radiation. All these effects damage defence
equipment besides causing human casualties. One of the relatively less known effects
accompanying a nuclear explosion, viz. the electromagnetic pulse (EMP), can impair
the performance of modern military equipment which rely heavily on solid state
technology and can even damage them without any effect on the human beings. This
EMP has a range, depending on the height of burst (HOB), at which other prompt
nuclear effects are insignificant. Thus, a knowledge of the origin of the EMP and its
interaction with a weapon system coupled with a knowledge of the other effects is
necessary to ensure equipment suvivability if enough personnel required30 operate
them remain combat effective. Such a programme is known as nuclear survivability
programme.
Prediction of effects of nuclear weapons is difficult because of considerable
advances in weapons1  since 1945. An energy research and development administration
report has given some puplic details of the achievements of 30 years of US nuclear
testing2.  The report mentions that 74 different types of weapons have been tested; at
one time or other 50 of them have been accepted for stockpile and 26 of them are
currently deployed in 33 weapon systems. Hardly a theoretically possible development
has been left unexplored. But, a thermonuclear weapon has never been used in a
combat nor a ballistic missile ever tested with a live warhead. Therefore, it is almost
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impossible to predict how technical systems would work under conditions in which
they have never been tested. The best one can do in making models is to try to
include as many dimensions of the problem as possible, make the most informed
guesses as to the values of the relevant parameters and attach large probable errors to
the resultsl.
2. Nuclear Explosion Phenomenon
For a chemical explosion, the detonation, velocity is around 6000 m/s. That is, a one
KT sphere of radius 5.5 m will detonate within a milli-second. The product gases will
have a temperature of about 3000°K  and initial pressures of about 2,00,000  atm.
Almost all energy released in a chemical explosion is converted into shock energy.
On the contrary, a one MT nuclear explosion produces about 4. 18 x 1Ol5 J in about
1 p set resulting in very high temperatures and pressures within the core of the
weapon. Jn early stages, radiation is the only means by which this energy of detona-
tion is dissipated. The energy radiated during this phase consists principally of soft
X-rays that are absorbed by surrounding air of about one metre radius. This heated
mass of air constitutes the fireball. As the fireball expands, part of the thermal energy
goes into shock wave. As the shock wave moves ahead of the fireball, it compresses
the air in front of it and renders it opaque to the radiations from the fireball within.
The thermal energy received at a target before the shock front detaches itself from
the fireball constitutes the first thermal pulse. For a 20 KT weapon, the duration of
the first thermal pulse is around3  11 ms. This pulse roughly carries with it only 1 per
cent of thermal energy.
When the energy in the shock-wave is degraded because of its continued expansion,
the opacity of the shocked air decreases steadily. with time and&i-&  after about
15 ms (for a 20 KT weapon) radiations.re@i
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a target, from the fireball within,
again increase. The radiations from the fireball now are in the visible and ‘infra-red
regions, due to its lower temperatures, in contrast to the soft X-rays emitted in the
first phase. This second pulse carries with it 99, per cent of the energy. of the weapon
and is responsible for first, second and third-degree burns at different distances and
also for retinal burns and firestorms started by the ignition of combustible material.
The duration of the thermal pulse is around 1.3 sec. for a 20 KT weapon and it is
evident that the first thermal pulse in insignificant. The duration of the second pulse
is determined by the,yield of the weapon, e.g. for a one kT  weapon, the duration
of the second pulse is about 0.3 sec. whereas for 100 kT and 10 MT weapons, the
second pulse is about 3 set and 30 sec. respectivly.
2.1 Damage from Thermal Radiation and its &fitigation
Poly vinyl chloride (PVC), foam rubber and nylon, that are extensively used in
vehicles because of their attractiveness from the point of view of weight, ease of
handling and cost, get ignited and burn. The required thermal energy of 60-70 Cal/cm”
for surface melting or darkening is delivered by one MT and 100 kT  weapons at
slant ranges of approximately four and 1.6 km respectively on a normal clear daya.
Nylon guys supporting aerials are melted by the thermal pulse. Minimizing the effects
of thermal gradients in a structure resulting from thermal exposure is important in
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. the design of a structure because thermal stresses created  in joints between dissimilar
metals could be sufficient to break the bond or buckle the plate5.  Though material
\ degradation arising out of exposure to thermal radiation may not be sufficient to
nullify a weapon system, it cannot be overlooked because the thermal pulse is closely
followed by the blast wave that would be impacting a weakened structure.
The best hardening technique against thermal radiation is to.use  a highly reflective
surface where possible and permissible. This reflects most of the radiation and no
significant changes in surface characteristics occur. To protect electronics, propellants,
ordnance and pessonnel inside protection structures, insulators may be used to keep
the heat deposited in the surface material from being conducted to the sensitive
components.
2.2 Damage from BIast and its Mitigation
The compressed air moving at very high speed constitutes the blast. Around 50
per cent of the yield of a weapon goes into blast energy provided the HOB is below
30 km. If a weapon is exploded above 30 km, no blast wave is produced, because
air is very thin at these attitudes. Blast causes most obvious equipment damage. Any
exposed weapon system will suffer damage both from the shock-front which strikes it
as a gigantic hammer and from the high winds that follow the blast. Targets are
specified as diffraction-sensitive if they are damaged by the peak over-pressure;
targets can also be damaged by the extremely strong winds in which case they are
ships gives several examples of drag-
saml  antennas. Depending on the struc-
ture, shape and size of the equipment, a given target may be more sensitive to one
type of loading than the other.
An important parameter in assessing damage to a weapon system from blast is
the duration of the over-pressure phase which determines the time for which the
target is acted on by it. To illustrate, the overpressure needed to render a tank
unbattleworthy from a one kT  explosion is 310 kN/mZ; this overpressure occurs
for a one kT  weapon at a range of 170 m. On the other hand for a one MT weapon,
the same damage will be sustained by a tank at a range of 2700 m (16 times larger
than for a one kT weapon though the yield is 100 times more) by an overpressure of
151.6 kN/m2 (roughly half the X&W for a one kT) because for megaton weapons the
blast wave is longer and so affects the target for a longer time. Thus, the defence
specification given to the supplier should include the over-pressure-time pulse shapes.
Functional requirements determine the structural design; this design should be
such as to maximise stiffness and ductility. These are to be consistent with weight,
cost and suitability for the application. Seals, blast valves and size of openings should
be selected to provide the needed protection from pressure build-up during the posi-
tive phase. In addition, the sealing mechanism should allow for rapid decline of
overpressure in the negative phase in order to reduce the tendency of the com$onent
to burst from internal perssures. As drag coefficient is dependent on target shape,
streamline principles can be applied. Reflected pressure problems can be minimized by
control of shapes wherever possible.
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2.3 Transient radiation damage and its mitigation
In considering prompt nuclear radiation environment on the functioning of electronic
systems, attention must be paid to both neutrons and gammas. Since the neutron -
carries no charge, it can easily penetrate solids and collide with atoms in the lattice
without any coulombic scattering. Since the neutron is considerably more massive
than the y photon (the mass ratio in theory is equal to infinity), it can dislodge an
atom from the lattice site; the average energy needed for this process6 is about 35 eV
and thus one must take into consideration the displacement damage caused by the
high energy neutrons produced in a nuclear explosion. Displacement damage depends
on the angle of impact of the neutron, its energy and the mass of the atom struck.
Any such displacement produces severe strain in the crystal structure resulting in
changes in thermal, electrical and mechanical properties. These deleterious effects of
neutrons depend on the total dose received and their energy. Because weapon materials
have considerable influence on neutron capture and hence on the neutron energy of
the neutrons that escape from the burst point, there is considerable difficulty in
expressing the relation between neutron dose, yield of the weapon and distance. Thus,
the actual number of neutrons emitted per kiloton of explosive energy yield and their
energy distribution may not only differ depending on fission or fusion weapons but
also for weapons of the same kind’.
Thus, three distinctive mechanisms exist for radiation effects on electronic equip-
ment* : (i) Ionisation arising out of dose rate contributed by the gamma fraction .\
alone results in the generation of electron-hole pairs in reverse-biased junctions. This
is a transient effect. (ii) Ionisation arising out of the total dose received with contri-
butions from both gamma and neutrons results in charge build up leading to increased
leakage current and decreased gain -at  low current. This is a permanent effect. (iii)
Displacement damage solely from neutrons is also a total dose effect which results
in increased resistivity due to removal of carriers. It is responsible for failure of p-n
diodes. This damage is also responsible for reduced minority carrier life time result-
ing in reduced gain and is the main cause for failure of bipolar transistors. This also
is a permanent effect.
The prompt y pulse, typically about 10 to 100 ns duration, responsible for the
creation of free electron-hole pairs across reverse-biased junctions, leads to upset of
or latch up or burn out in semiconductor circuits5.  The upset condition may also
result in permanent loss of data in a digitally-controlled system-necessitating the
delivery of programming material from another unit*.  Many deleterious effects, such
as voltage kick back from an inductor load, lock-up in balanced circuits, unacceptable
restart conditions. etc. can occur in circuits. Operational amplifiers are extremely
sensitive to neutron environment as evinced by the reduced input impedance
and decreased open loop gain”. Special attention is needed in circuits employing
matched pairs of transistors/diodes since the matched parameters will not
necessarily track in the same direction and by the same magnitude. Signal and power
diodes will show changes in forward and reverse voltages and also reverse leakage
current as a result of displacement damage. Assessment of these effects must be based
on individual applications. Zener diodes exhibit permanent shifts in Zener voltages.
Digital integrated circuits will undergo permanent changes in fanout and input
current.
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The techniques that are used to mitigate the above effects and to harden electronic
systems are : (i) using shields for sensitive parts, (ii) selecting parts with high cut-
off frequencies (>  50 MHz) (iii) avoiding MOS devices in high total dose environ-
ments because these devices exhibit a change in gate voltage at low dose levels. Since
light nuclei are very effective in degrading the neutron energy, hydrogenous materials
such as polyethylene or paraffin are the most effective materials. To slow down fast
neutrons inelastic scatterers such as iron are effective but they become sources of
secondary gammas and hence are not recommended.
2.4 Damage from EMP and its Mitigation
The EMP arises as a result of an assymmetry in the distribution of the compton
3 electron current (this assymmetry can be achieved by an asymmetric shield in the
weapon design) produced by ionisation of the air moIec$es by a small fraction of
gammas produced in the explosion. The , @?m@r &’  y s from a weapon of yield9 Y
kilotons is 7.5 x lO”l Y. The region constituting the outward moving electrons and
the relatively immobile positive ions is called the SOURCE REGION. The asymmetry
in the source region gives rise to a RADIATED FIELD. The size of the source region
and the area of earth illuminated by the radiated field are dependent on HOB.
TablelO 1 illustrates the extent of EMP coverage for an exoatmospheric  (HOB  above
35-40 km) burst.
Table 1. EMP coverage
04 surface from GZ (km)
100 1250
200 1760
300 2150
For an endo-atmospheric  burst (HOB upto 30 km), the source regipn and
the region covered by the radiated field are smaller. The frequency spectrum of the
EMP has components upto 100 MHz for an exo-atmospheric burst and upto 1 MHz
for a nea; s’ &@F burstll. The rise time for the EMP is ry 10 ns
whereas for s. Any conductor in the path of the EMP can
efficiently couple wirh the radiated EMP. The induced voltage can. be easily fed into a
neighbouring condu@or  as a spark or as a current if there is an electrical continuity,
The electric fields for a near surface burst are - IO5 V/m and the EMP in this case
has an azimuthal magnetic field. For a high altitude burst, the electric field is about
an order of magnitude lower but the radiated field does not attenuate that rapidly as
in a near-surface burst.
Fig. 1 illustrates how an EMP can interact with an aircraft12. The degradatin  of
or damage to a system by the EMP arises due to the following mechanisms : (i)
incident EMP causes current and charge on the external surface, (ii) surface currents
and charges excite inadvertent penetrations, (iii) the penetrations couple to internal
cables, and (iv) the cable systems couple to critical subsystems.
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Figure 1. System EMP interaction.
The way the EMP energy jscoJlecte,d  is quite complex because ‘jt is dependent on
the shape and size of the collector, its orie&&on  with  respect to the  pulse source and
on its frequency spectrum. It is worth mentioning here~that  the EMI and EMC com-
munities have evolved over the past 40 years whereas concern for EMP and
ment of protection concepts are about IO years oldr”.
Protection against EMP is similar to protection against ‘EMI/Lightning.  Recent .;.
experience with F-16 aircraft has shown that the implementation of a stringent EMI/
Jightnjng protection programme can result in adequate EMP protectionlz. Partjcular
techniques include : (i) installing the most sensitive equipment in the area of maximum
EM attenuation known as
with loops, (iii) use of-screen
(v) making all interconnections
I, .i*J*car-*  i*iip
3. Necessity to Establish Criteria_*.
The foregoing account has shown how various effects accompanying a nuclear
explosion can degrade weapon systems and equipment. Because new equipment costs
are very high, it may not be possible to carry out real trials as were done a few years
ago. Incorporating nuclear hardening into a new design should be an integral part of
the design process. This necessitates a strong interaction between the designers of
equipment and nuclear hardening group
environment and its impact on the prop
The hardness analysis group will analyse
each of the nuclear environments-thermal, blast, nuclear radiation and EMP. To
perform this analysis, detailed data on parts and material response$  is needed,
Literature shows that these analyses are performed using sophistic%ed~  GoiI$i63i
programmes that model the item and predict its response. These analyses
formed at higher threat level than specified to establish what are known a.$
margins13 (DM). The design margin is the ratio of the level at
part/component/system occurs to the anticipated level in a nuclear
is always greater than unity. Currently followed design m
weapon system for the various nuclear environments are :
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(i) NEUTRONS DM ne”tr~r?~f~~  iiylure > 10
(ii) THERMAL DM temperature at failure , 2criteria temperature
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(iv) EMP _DM20 log
(
Induced current flow for damage
Induced current >
> 1. dB
(v) TOTAL DOSE  DM %!??;$;;~-f~@!~ > 1
(iii) OVERPRESSURE DM overpressure causing failureoverpressure criteria >3r_  _
i.e if we consider the neutron environment, the component/system should exhibit
degradation at 10 times the neutron fIua.ex~e$ted..i~+reaI  conditions and so on. .* ,.*  V^
The requirements for each nuclear environment vary because for blast and thermal
radiation, structural response is important, whereas for EMP and transient radiation,
primary considerations are electronics survival and circuit response.
.,, i
For neutron environment, components/systems are tested in a reactor test facility;
testing of components for specified gamma dose can be carried out in spent fuel store
of a nuclear reactors~13.  Linear accelerator facilities are used for testing of components
for both gamma dose rate and total gamma dose effectss. Validation testing for
thermal effects are carried out with solar furnaces and flash arraysIs.  Testing for blast
for dynamic pressure effects shock
s“‘b~~~ tunnel (probably the only
shock, tube of its size in the world) can test equipment upto a main battle tank head-” I w  “ .i &,,*,“i,  *“> $4‘  .y*“;?  ~ - , * Z ” i, T .’ .,
on*. Validation testing of components systems for EM?  IS carried out with specialized
equipment capable of delivering the required pulse in a specified times. For EMP,
the largest threat level simulator in the world is the Air Force Weapons Laboratory
in Albuquerque, New Mexico, where the strategic B-52 bombers or the large C-5A
cargo aircraft can be tested12.
4. Conclusion
The harder&@ aknowledge  of the following parameters : (a) the ”
peak static overpressure, peak dynamic pressure (kN/m2),  the positive phase duration
and impulses from both these components, (b) the total thermal flux (AU,,m*) and the
time in seconds required for this flux to be delivered and also the maximum irradiance
(MW/mZ)  (c) total y and n,”  the peak y dose rate, maximum neutron flux (neutrons/
mm2) and the maximum neutron dose, and (d) EMP arising out of exo- and/or endo-
atmospheric bursts.
Thus, in the operation and maintenance of nuclear hardened equipment/system,
the importance of segregating the hardened spares or sub-units from the unhardened
spares cannot be overstressed. A hardness qualified transistor from one supplier may
have the same characteristics as a transistor from another supplier that has not been
hardened13.  Replacement in a hardened system by an unhardened component would
thus result ‘in overall degradation of the complete system. _
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